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INTRODUCTION 
This Reply Brief addresses only those matters raised by the 
cross-appeal of plaintiffs-appellees Alta Industries Ltd. dba 
Steelco and Alta Industries - Utah, Inc. (hereinafter, "Steelco") 
Steelco's opening Brief on the cross-appeal is found at pages 
80-91 of its "Brief of Appellees and Cross-Appellants." The 
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Response of defendants-appellants to that cross-appeal is found 
at pages 44-51 of the "Reply Brief of Defendants/Appellants and 
Reply to Cross-Appeal." 
This Reply Brief does not reply to the remainder of the 
Reply Brief of defendants-appellants because the rules do not 
permit such a reply. Rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure. Steelco has filed a Motion to Strike the Reply Brief of 
defendants-appellants because it impermissibly introduces exten-
sive materials (including 20-odd pages of factual argument) that 
were not limited to answering the matters set forth in Steelcofs 
Brief. That Motion was unresolved as of the date of filing of 
this Brief. 
The trial court found for Steelco on its fraud, conversion, 
and conspiracy theories, but upon purely legal grounds rejected 
Steelcofs claims for the same losses under the Racketeering 
Enterprises Act and under Utahfs receiving stolen property 
statute. Steelco's cross-appeal challenges only the trial 
court's rejection of its racketeering and statutory receiving 
stolen property claims. 
ARGUMENT 
Steelcofs claims under the Racketeering Enterprises Act and 
receiving stolen property statute arise from a relatively simple, 
often repeated, factual pattern. The claims involve the same 
three persons -- Volma Heaton and Chris Williams, who were both 
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then employees of Steelco, and defendant Lynn Hurst, who was then 
general manager of defendant Wasatch Steel. Over a four-plus 
year period, Volma Heaton stole on the order of 100 loads of 
steel from his employer, Steelco, and delivered that steel to 
Wasatch Steel. [R336, et: ^ e£. ; Findings of Fact 116, 8, 11.] 
[R451 at 6, 148-50.] Chris Williams sometimes assisted Heaton in 
his deliveries and accompanied him on his trips to Wasatch Steel. 
[R451 at 6, 148-50.] The fact that Heaton stole this steel from 
his employer, Steelco, and delivered it to Wasatch Steel is not 
disputed. It is also not disputed that Wasatch Steel paid Heaton 
only a fraction of the value of the steel, as the court found. 
[Findings of Fact 127; R343; R450 at 52-53.] The trial court 
found that both Hurst and Wasatch Steel knew that Heaton was 
stealing the steel materials from Steelco and delivering and 
reselling them to Wasatch Steel. [R338; Findings of Fact 113.] 
Indeed, the trial court found a fraud and conspiracy between 
Wasatch Steel and Hurst, on the one hand, and Volma Heaton, on 
the other hand, to steal material from Steelco for use and resale 
by Wasatch Steel. [Findings of Fact 1114, 15, 26; R339, et seq.] 
The trial court also found that Wasatch Steel and Hurst paid 
at least eleven kickbacks to the very same Steelco employees 
involved in the theft scheme -- Volma Heaton and Chris Williams. 
[R344-45; Findings of Fact 132.] Wasatch Steel and Hurst paid 
those kickbacks to Steelcofs employees to induce them to cause 
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their employer, Steelco, to pay more for materials purchased from 
Wasatch Steel than would otherwise have been paid. [R345-47; 
Findings of Fact 1133, 34.] The trial court similarly found both 
a fraud and a conspiracy between Wasatch Steel and Hurst, on the 
one hand, and Heaton and Williams, on the other hand, to inflate 
the prices paid by Steelco for materials that it purchased from 
Wasatch Steel. [R345, et. £e£. ; Findings of Fact 1133-45.] 
Steelcofs racketeering and receiving stolen property claims 
arise from the theft and bribery transactions generally outlined 
above. Although these theories afford recovery of the very same 
losses for which the court gave Steelco judgment under conver-
sion, fraud, and conspiracy theories, the measure of damages and 
the statutory entitlement to attorney's fees available under 
these laws gave rise to Steelco1s cross-appeal. 
I. THE RACKETEERING ENTERPRISES ACT CLAIM 
At pages 80-86 of its opening Brief, Steelco demonstrated 
that it had proved, and the court had found, each element to 
defendants1 liability under the Racketeering Enterprises Act, 
Utah Code Ann. §§76-10-1601, et se%. (the "Act"). Defendants1 
responsive Brief at pages 45 to 48 contains four points, which 
are addressed in turn. 
A. The Separate Victim Theory. Defendants preliminarily 
argue that the trial court found that Steelco had established 
none of the elements for a racketeering claim. The record does 
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not support that position. The trial court in its Memorandum 
Decision stated only the following with respect to its rejection 
of Steelco's racketeering claims: 
25. The acts of the parties herein do 
not bring them within the racketeering act. 
The necessary requirements are not met. The 
Court finds that for the racketeering act to 
apply, there must be three similar episodes 
that involve separate and different entities, 
and not within the same entity. The purpose 
of the racketeering act is to prohibit 
racketeering. That is, to prohibit illegal 
businesses being set up to defraud other 
businesses or people as a racket. The fact 
that there were similar episodes involving 
Heaton and Wasatch Steel do not satisfy the 
requirements. [R279.] (Emphasis added) 
Thus, the only shortcoming advanced by the court in plaintiffs' 
racketeering claim was plaintiffs1 failure to show three similar 
episodes of unlawful activity "that involve separate and differ-
ent entities.11 
Consistently, the Findings of Fact entered by the trial 
court at paragraph 62 stated as follows: 
62. Plaintiffs did not prove the 
existence of three similar episodes of 
unlawful activity that involve separate and 
The trial court seems to have believed that the Act was 
limited to "illegal businesses" that were created to defraud 
multiple victims "as a racket." Both the Utah Court of Appeals 
and the United States Supreme Court have held that the Act "is 
not limited in application to persons affiliated with organized 
crime." State v. Thompson, 751 P.2d 805, 815 (Utah App. 1988). 
different entities, as is required by the 
Racketeering Act. Plaintiffs demonstrated 
only that Wasatch Steel Inc. and Hurst 
engaged in episodes of unlawful activity 
involving Steelco, but not any other persons 
or entities. [R359.] 
Defendants suggest in their Brief that this "terse" finding was 
somehow incomplete or flawed. However, defendants stated 
expressly to the trial court that they took "no exception" to 
this very finding [R315] and did not suggest or request any other 
findings on this issue in their 39 pages of objections to the 
Findings and Conclusions. [R283, et seq.] 
The provisions quoted above constitute all of the court's 
reasoning for its rejection of Steelco1s racketeering claim. As 
is readily apparent, the only basis advanced by the court was 
Steelcofs failure to demonstrate three or more episodes of 
unlawful activity involving more than one victim. Steelcofs 
opening Brief at pages 84-86 demonstrates that the Act does not 
require more than one victim; indeed, the Act requires that the 
episodes of unlawful activity "have the same or similar purposes, 
results, participants, victims, or methods of commission. . . . " 
(Emphasis added.) Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1602(2). Defendants1 
Brief does not make any effort to sustain this exclusive basis 
for the court's decision. 
Instead, defendants advance the following three arguments, 
none of which were found, or even mentioned, by the trial court 
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in either its Memorandum Decision or in its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. 
B. Steelco Showed a Predicate Offense. The trial court's 
Findings establish clearly three and perhaps four predicate 
offenses: 
Theft. Section 76-6-404 defines theft as follows: 
A person commits theft if he obtains or 
exercises unauthorized control over the 
property of another with a purpose to deprive 
him thereof. 
The court found that "Heaton stole from Steelco all of the11 
materials for which recovery is sought in this case. [Findings 
of Fact 111; R338.] The court found that Hurst and Wasatch Steel 
knew that Heaton was stealing the materials. [Findings of Fact 
113; R338.] The court also found that "Wasatch Steel Inc. and 
Hurst intentionally exercised dominion and control over the 
Stolen Steel that was stolen by Heaton from Steelco and delivered 
to Wasatch Steel Inc." and that "Wasatch Steelco Inc. and Hurst 
wrongfully, intentionally, and willfully exercised dominion and 
control over the Stolen Steel in violation of the rights of 
Steelco and without lawful justification and intended to deprive 
Steelco of the Stolen Steel." [Findings of Fact 1118, 20; 
R340-41.] Defendants do not even address theft as a predicate 
offense or these findings by the court that such thefts occurred. 
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Receiving Stolen Property. As discussed under point II of 
this Brief, the trial court did reject a finding of civil liabil-
ity for Wasatch Steel and Hurst's receipt of stolen property 
under the receiving stolen property statute, which expressly 
requires that the defendant be a person dealing in used or 
secondhand property. However, the court found all elements 
necessary to establish the crime of receiving stolen property 
under Subsection 1 of the same statute, §76-6-408(1), which is an 
enumerated predicate offense under the Act and which does not 
have any requirement that defendant be a dealer in used goods. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1602(4)(n). Section 76-6-408(1) provides 
as follows: 
(1) A person commits theft if he 
receives, retains, or disposes of the prop-
erty of another knowing that it has been 
stolen, or believing that it probably has 
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, with-
holds or aids in concealing, selling, or 
withholding any such property from the owner, 
knowing the property to be stolen, with a 
purpose to deprive the owner thereof. 
As shown in the preceding section, the court specifically found 
that Wasatch Steel and Hurst received steel stolen from Steelco 
knowing that it had been stolen and sold and disposed of that 
steel, knowing it to have been stolen, with a purpose of depriv-
ing Steelco thereof. 
Bribery. Section 76-10-1602(4)(s) makes "bribery or receiv-
ing bribe by person in the business of selection, appraisal, or 
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criticism of goods, Section 76-10-508" a predicate offense. 
Section 76-6-508 provides that such a person is guilty of bribery 
if "he solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit to 
influence his selection, appraisal, or criticism." The court 
unquestionably found that Volma Heaton and Chris Williams ac-
cepted the kickbacks to cause them to artificially inflate the 
prices their employer paid for steel sold by Wasatch Steel, 
[Findings of Fact 1132, 33, 34, 35, 36; R344-48.] It is true 
that the trial court did not in its Findings state that either 
Heaton or Williams was "in the business of selection, appraisal, 
or criticism of goods." Section 76-10-1602(4). The court did 
find, however, that both Heaton and Williams "participated in the 
ordering and purchasing by Steelco of certain steel products" and 
"were in a position at Steelco to influence the prices that 
Steelco paid for certain steel that Steelco purchased from 
others, including Wasatch Steel Inc." [Findings of Fact 131; 
R344.] Whether that finding renders Williams and Heaton a 
"person in the business of selection, appraisal, or criticism of 
goods" is a question of law for this Court's decision. If Heaton 
and Williams were such persons, all of the elements of bribery 
have been established. 
Aiding, Soliciting, and Conspiring. Defendants casually 
dismiss conspiracy as a predicate offense by stating that con-
spiracy, by itself, cannot constitute a predicate offense. 
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[Defendants' Brief, p.46 n.10.] However, the Act provides that a 
predicate offense is committed not only if one actually commits 
an enumerated offense himself or herself, but also if one solic-
its, requests, commands, encourages, intentionally aids or 
conspires to engage in any specifically enumerated predicate 
offense. Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1602(4). Defendants ignore this 
language. As noted above, the court found that Volma Heaton 
committed multiple thefts and that all elements of the crime of 
bribery had been shown with respect to Williams and Heaton 
(provided that Williams and Heaton were in the business of 
selecting goods). The court specifically found that Hurst and 
Wasatch Steel assisted, aided, requested, and conspired with 
Williams and Heaton with respect to these thefts and bribes. 
[Findings of Fact 1114, 15, 32, 33, 34, 42, 43, 44; R339, et 
seq.] Thus, by assisting and conspiring with Williams and Heaton 
in their independent crimes of theft and bribery, Hurst and 
Wasatch Steel themselves committed predicate offenses under 
Section 76-10-1602(4). 
Only one predicate offense is required, but Steelco proved 
three or four. Defendants1 remaining two arguments cannot 
properly be considered on appeal, since neither of them was 
properly raised below. E.g., Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis 
Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1980). Defendants' 
written final argument is found at R387, et se%. The only basis 
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advanced there for rejecting Steelcofs racketeering claim is the 
failure to show a predicate offense. [R401-05.] After the trial 
court decided the case, defendants did not suggest or request any 
findings or conclusions on the two new theories, which are 
presented for the first time in defendants1 Reply Brief. [R283.] 
Defendants1 arguments, addressed immediately below, that Steelco 
failed to show a "pattern of unlawful activity11 or an "enter-
prise" cannot properly be considered by this Court. 
C. Steelco Showed a "Pattern of Unlawful Activity". This 
is another basis advanced by defendants which was never mentioned 
by the trial court. The parties agree upon the governing stat-
utory definition of a pattern: 
(2) "Pattern of unlawful activity" 
means engaging in conduct which constitutes 
the commission of at least three episodes of 
unlawful activity, which episodes are not 
isolated, but have the same or similar 
purposes, results, participants, victims, or 
methods of commission, or otherwise are 
interrelated by distinguishing characteris-
tics. Taken together, the episodes shall 
demonstrate continuing unlawful conduct and 
be related either to each other or to the 
enterprise. Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1602(2). 
Following is a complete description from defendants1 Brief of the 
deficiency they claim exists in Steelco's proof of a pattern in 
this case: 
At most, plaintiffs1 claims assert 
multiple acts to promote the same transaction 
or episode. There was only one actual or 
potential victim and no evidence of a broader 
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set of criminal objectives. In short, there 
was no pattern of racketeering activity. 
[Defendants' Brief, p.47.] 
Both the Utah courts and governing federal authority reject 
defendants1 argument. In State v. Thompson, 751 P.2d 805, 816-17 
(Utah App. 1988), the Utah Court of Appeals analyzed the analo-
gous federal authorities and rejected defendant's position. In 
Thompson, defendant argued that several bribes could not consti-
tute a pattern because the bribes were "part of only a single 
episode of racketeering conduct" [_Id. at 816] and ftwere in 
furtherance of a single criminal objective11 [JA. at 817.] The 
Court rejected that argument holding that separate bribes that 
were a part of the same overall scheme constituted a "pattern" 
under the Act. 
The Act's statutory definition of pattern requires (i) at 
least three episodes of unlawful activity, (ii) some relationship 
between the activities, and (iii) some showing of continuity of 
the unlawful conduct. Although the definition of pattern in the 
federal RICO Act is not so comprehensive, the federal courts have 
by interpretation adopted what in Utah is the statutory defini-
tion of pattern. E.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 
479, 496 n.14, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 3285 n.14 (1985); and, more 
recently, H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 109 S.Ct. 
2893, 2899-2902 (1989). Those cases firmly embrace the Utah 
statutory definition of pattern and amplify on the requirements 
of relationship and continuity. 
RICOfs legislative history reveals Congress1 
intent that to prove a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity a plaintiff or prosecutor must 
show that the racketeering predicates are 
related, and that they amount to or pose a 
threat of continued criminal activity. 
For analytic purposes these two constituents 
of RICOfs pattern requirement must be stated 
separately, though in practice their proof 
will often overlap. H.J. Inc., 109 S.Ct., 
supra, at 2900. 
The H.J. Court went on to state that the relationship requirement 
is established "if it embraces criminal acts that have the same 
or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods 
of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing 
characteristics that are not isolated events.11 Ld. at 2901. 
This language is an almost verbatim quotation of the Utah Actfs 
requirement of "relationship.11 
Here, the "relationship" requirement is fulfilled as pre-
scribed by the statutory language. The thefts had the same or 
similar purposes -- acquiring steel stolen from Steelco at 
bargain prices for resale by Wasatch Steel at a profit. The 
result was always the same --in the case of the steel thefts, 
Steelco lost its steel, and Heaton and Wasatch Steel in substance 
divided the value between them -- Heaton was paid a fraction of 
its value, and Wasatch Steel resold it at a handsome profit. In 
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the case of the bribes, a similar pattern emerged. The amount by 
which the price paid by Steelco was fraudulently inflated was 
split between Hurst/Wasatch Steel, on the one hand, and the 
recipient of the bribe, Williams/Heaton, on the other hand. 
Again, Steelco lost. The episodes had the same participants --
Wasatch Steel, Hurst, Heaton, and Williams. They had the same 
victim -- Steelco. They had the same methods of commission — 
each theft and delivery and each bribe transaction were virtually 
identical to the others. Relationship has been established here. 
With respect to the "continuity" requirement, there was some 
division of authority prior to the Supreme Court's decision in 
the H.J, case. Some courts held that continuity required that a 
single fraudulent scheme embracing multiple acts was insufficient 
to establish the pattern requirement. The H.J. Court specifically 
rejected that position and stated: 
We adopt a less inflexible approach that 
seems to us to derive from a common-sense, 
everyday understanding of RICO's language and 
Congress1 gloss on it. What a plaintiff or 
prosecutor must prove is continuity of 
racketeering activity, or its threat, 
simpliciter. Id. at 2901. 
The H.J. Court went on to show examples of various methods by 
which continuity may be proved: 
A party alleging a RICO violation may demon-
strate continuity over a closed period by 
proving a series of related predicates 
extending over a substantial period of time. 
Id. at 2902. 
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Here, we have on the order of 100 thefts over a four year period 
of time -- clearly satisfying the continuity requirement. The 
Supreme Court also identified other methods by which continuity 
can be established: 
The continuity requirement is likewise 
satisfied where it is shown that the predi-
cates are a regular way of conducting defen-
dant's ongoing legitimate business (in the 
sense that it is not a business that exists 
for criminal purposes) or of conducting or 
participating in an ongoing and legitimate 
RICO "enterprise." Id. at 2902. 
Again, Wasatch Steel's receipt over four years of 100-odd loads 
of stolen steel and its payment of at least eleven bribes, as a 
matter of law, establish a regular way of conducting Wasatch 
Steel's ongoing business. 
The federal district court cases cited in defendants' Brief 
were decided prior to the controlling H.J, case, are inconsistent 
with it, and do not concern multiple criminal acts such as are 
presented here -- 100-odd discrete thefts and eleven or more 
discrete bribes. Rather, defendants' cases address whether a 
single fraudulent scheme, loan transaction, or brokerage account 
can constitute a "pattern." Steelco respectfully submits that if 
defendants1 knowing receipt of stolen materials on 100-odd 
occasions and payment of eleven separate bribes over a four year 
period do not constitute a "pattern of unlawful activity," the 
requirement cannot ever as a practical matter be fulfilled. 
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D. Steelco has Shown a Racketeering Enterprise. Defen-
dants1 claimed absence of proof of an "enterprise" was also never 
argued by them or found by the trial court below. Section 
76-10-1603 generally requires a showing that there existed an 
"enterprise" to which any "person" was related through a pattern 
of unlawful activity. The term "enterprise" is defined in 
Section 76-10-1602(1): 
(1) "Enterprise" means any individual, 
sole proprietorship, partnership, corpora-
tion, business trust, association, or other 
legal entity, and any union or group of 
individuals associated in fact although not a 
legal entity, and includes illicit as well as 
licit entities. 
This Court in State v. McGrath, 749 P.2d 631 (Utah 1988) adopted 
a sweeping definition of that language. In McGrath, the Court 
concluded that an "ongoing association" between defendant and one 
Marcus established the existence of the requisite enterprise: 
Defendant and Marcus had an ongoing associa-
tion in fact for the purpose of making money 
from the sale of controlled substances. 
Defendant regularly "fronted" drugs to 
Marcus, who in turn sold them to individual 
users. When the two men experienced diffi-
culty keeping track of their accounts, they 
agreed to keep written accounts of their 
numerous transactions. A ledger book kept by 
Marcus showed seventy-four transactions 
between him and defendant. This association 
was much more than an isolated transaction 
between an independent seller and buyer 
conducted at arm's length. Defendant often 
had others deliver for him and compensated 
them for their services. Marcus bought his 
supplies from other sources only when defen-
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dant was unavailable. The two men functioned 
as a "continuing unit for a common purpose of 
engaging in a course of conduct." These 
facts show an ongoing enterprise the purpose 
of which was to traffic in controlled sub-
stances . 
Id. at 637. Here, there was a very similar relationship between 
Heaton and Hurst/Wasatch Steel which established such an "enter-
prise.11 Through an ongoing conspiracy, as the trial court found, 
Heaton systematically stole product from his employer, Steelco, 
and delivered the stolen goods to Wasatch Steel for resale. 
Heaton was paid a fraction of the value of the steel with Wasatch 
Steel receiving the balance in profits. Similarly, in the case 
of the kickbacks, Hurst/Wasatch Steel, on the one hand, and 
Heaton and Williams, on the other hand, had an agreement under 
which Heaton and Williams would cause their employer, Steelco, to 
pay an inflated price for steel sold by Wasatch Steel, with the 
price bump being split between Wasatch Steel and/or Hurst, on the 
one hand, and Williams and Hurst, on the other hand. Since the 
trial court expressly found that Hurst and Wasatch Steel con-
spired with Heaton and Williams as just indicated, the trial 
court made all necessary findings to determine the existence of 
several "enterprises," both with respect to the steel thefts and 
the kickbacks -- one between Wasatch Steel/Hurst and Heaton as to 
thefts, one between Wasatch Steel/Hurst and Heaton as to bribes, 
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one between Wasatch Steel/Hurst and Williams as to bribes, and 
one between Hurst and Wasatch Steel as to both bribes and thefts. 
Finally, defendants argue that the "enterprise" must be 
distinct from the "persons" who are defendants in the action. 
First, as has been demonstrated above, Steelco proved several 
"enterprises," each of which is distinct from the persons who are 
defendants in this action. As this Court found in McGrath, an 
association between a named defendant and another constitutes 
such an enterprise, which is exactly the situation here. Second, 
any distinctness requirement applies only to Subsection (3) of 
Section 76-10-1603. Defendants have cited two cases (Grant v. 
Union Bank, 629 F.Supp. 570 (D.Utah 1986) and Bennett v. United 
States Trust Co. of New York, 770 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1985), cert, 
denied, 106 S.Ct. 800 (1986)) that hold that the "enterprise" 
must be distinct from the "persons" who are defendants in the 
action under 18 U.S.C. §1962(c). The courts have applied a 
different rule with respect to 18 U.S.C. §1962(a) and (b)_, which 
are substantially similar to Subsections (1) and (2) of Utah Code 
Ann. §76-10-1603. The courts have held £hat, with respect to 
claims under Subsections (a) or (b) of 18 U.S.C. §1962, a named 
defendant may be both the responsible "person" and the "enter-
prise" to establish liability under the Act. E.g., Petro-Tech, 
Inc. v. Western Co. of North America, 824 F.2d 1349, 1361 (3rd 
Cir. 1987) ("where a corporation engages in racketeering activ-
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ities and is the direct or indirect beneficiary of the pattern of 
racketeering activity, it can be both the [liable] "person" and 
the "enterprise" under Section 1962(a)"); to the same effect, see 
Masi v, Ford City Bank & Trust Co., 779 F.2d 397, 402 (7th Cir. 
1985); Schreiber Distrib. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 
1393, 1398 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that if a corporation is the 
direct or indirect beneficiary of the pattern of racketeering 
activity, it can be both the "person" and the "enterprise" for 
violations under Sections 18 U.S.C. 1962(a) or (b)). Here, 
Wasatch Steel engaged in racketeering activities and was the 
direct or indirect beneficiary of the pattern of racketeering 
activity by (i) purchasing goods known to be stolen at bargain 
prices and (ii) selling its own goods to Steelco at fraudulently 
inflated prices. Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1603(1) and (2) are 
substantially identical to the corresponding provisions of the 
federal act contained in 18 U.S.C. §1962(a) and (b). Subsection 
1 provides as follows: 
It is unlawful for any person who has re-
ceived any proceeds derived . . . from a 
pattern of unlawful activity in which the 
person has participated as a principal, to 
use or invest, directly or indirectly, any 
part of that income, or the proceeds of the 
income . . . in the acquisition of any 
interest in or the establishment or operation 
of, any enterprise. 
The trial court specifically found that Wasatch Steel used the 
profits received from resales of the stolen steel in the business 
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of Wasatch Steel. [Findings of Fact 114; R339.] Similarly, the 
court expressly found that Wasatch Steel received an inflated 
price for the steel that it sold to Steelco with respect to which 
kickbacks were paid. [Findings of Fact 1133-35; R345-47.] Five 
enterprises have been established in this case: (i) the asso-
ciation of Hurst and Wasatch Steel as to both bribes and thefts, 
(ii) the association of Wasatch Steel/Hurst and Williams as to 
bribes, (iii) the association of Wasatch Steel/Hurst and Heaton 
as to thefts, (iv) the association of Wasatch Steel/Hurst and 
Heaton as to bribes, and (v) Wasatch Steel, a corporation, 
itself. Only one is required. Finally, an enterprise can be 
established through the continuing association of Lynn Hurst and 
Wasatch Steel Inc. to defraud Steelco. That is, Hurst, as an 
employee of Wasatch Steel, and Wasatch Steel, as a distinct 
entity, joined together in an association, which is not named as 
a defendant in this case, to defraud Steelco through the stolen 
steel and kickback transactions. 
II. STEELCO IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER 
UNDER THE RECEIVING- STOLEN PROPfiRTTTSTSTUTE 
Defendants advance two arguments why Steelco should not 
recover under the receiving stolen property statute: First, 
defendants claim that they are not included in the class of 
persons mentioned in Section 76-6-408(2)(d). Second, defendants 
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claim that there was an inadequate showing that defendants knew 
the goods were stolen. Each will be addressed in turn. 
Section 76-6-412(2) only renders liable "any person men-
tioned in Subsection 76-6-408(2)(d).ff That subsection in turn 
defines that class of persons as Ma pawnbroker or person who has 
or operates a business dealing in or collecting used or second-
hand merchandise or personal property." Defendants concede, as 
they must, and the court correctly found that Wasatch Steel is in 
the business of purchasing and selling used steel. [Findings of 
Fact 13; R335.] Instead, defendants argue with neither authority 
nor logic that the statute describes and applies only to pawn-
brokers. If the legislature had intended the statute to describe 
and apply only to pawnbrokers, why on earth did the legislature 
provide that the class of potentially liable defendants includes 
f,a pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in 
or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal prop-
erty. . . ." Defendants1 argument entirely reads out of the 
statute the underscored language. This Court has uniformly held 
that, in interpreting a statute, effect should be given to "every 
word of the statute." Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 252 n.ll 
(Utah 1988). Further, the words of a statute should be given 
their "commonly accepted meanings." Hector, Inc. v. United 
Savings & Loan Ass'n, 741 P.2d 542, 546 (Utah 1987). Wasatch 
Steel and Hurst are, according to the trial court's Findings, 
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parties who have or operate a business "dealing in 
used . . . personal property11 within the commonly accepted 
meaning of those terms. 
Defendants next argue that an inadequate showing has been 
made that defendants knew the goods were stolen. First, the 
court expressly so found. [Findings of Fact 113; R338.] As was 
demonstrated in Steelcofs opening Brief, that finding is amply 
supported by the record. In addition, Steelco proved and the 
trial court found the facts that give rise to a statutory pre-
sumption of that requisite knowledge-under Section 
76-6-408(2)(d)(2). Those four bases for the statutory pre-
sumption are identified at pages 87-89 of Steelcofs opening 
Brief. Defendants1 only response is that the findings cited 
therein are clearly erroneous and were not made in sufficient 
detail. [Defendants1 Reply Brief at pp. 49-50.] No effort was 
made to establish that the findings were clearly erroneous. In 
most cases, the findings are of objective facts and are stated in 
graphic detail. The four bases for the statutory presumption of 
knowledge are, in the main, uncontested: (a) Defendants were in 
possession of property stolen on a separate occasion [Findings of 
Fact 110]; (b) Defendants received stolen property within the 
year preceding the transaction in question [Findings of Fact 
110]; (c) Defendants acquired the material for consideration 
known to be far below its value [Findings of Fact 114]; and (d) 
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Defendants received property without requiring that the seller 
certify in writing as to his ownership of the property, as Lynn 
Hurst himself testified was the fact [R450 at 68]. Under Section 
76-6-408(2), any of the four foregoing items suffice to give rise 
to a presumption that defendants knew or believed that the 
subject property was stolen or probably stolen. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court found each element to defendants1 liability 
under both the Racketeering Enterprises Act and Utah's receiving 
stolen property statute. The lower court rejected defendants1 
liability under these statutes based upon an erroneous legal 
interpretation of both statutes. Defendants1 arguments are based 
upon matters generally not argued to the trial court, not found 
by the trial court, and not supported by the evidence. 
Steelco respectfully requests that this Court grant the 
relief requested in the Conclusion of its opening Brief. 
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